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Comments
W. Rod Dolmage*

A Case For The "Political
Question" Doctrine?
Adler v. Ontario

"Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more ......
(King Henry V; III, i, 1)
Adler v. Ontario:' The Context
The problem of how much, if any, public support should be afforded to
private parochial 2 schools might appear simple in principle: either fund
them in a fashion similar to the "public" schools, or do not fund them at
all. However, in the Canadian context, public funding of parochial
schools has turned out to be extremely problematic in practice.
The unique nature of Canadian confederation necessitated an unusual
complication - provision for publicly supported separate or dissentient
schools. These schools were required in order to convince Roman
Catholics in Upper Canada and the Maritime provinces, and Protestants
in Lower Canada, that confederation would not threaten their religious
and cultural heritage.3 Even this complicated, dual-system model of
education was, however, somewhat simplistic as it failed to account for
those parents who, for reasons of religious conviction, could neither
support, nor in good conscience send their children to, either generic (i.e.,
non-sectarian) Protestant or Roman Catholic schools.
Citizens who found themselves in provinces with no publicly supported separate or dissentient schools, or who could support neither,
found that their only option was, and is, to establish their own denomina-

* Assistant Professor, Division of Educational Policy Studies, Faculty of Education, University of Western Ontario.
I. Adler v. Ontario(1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 676 (Div.C.).
2. For purposes of clarity, in the following discussion parochial schools are defined as
Canadian schools which have a religious affiliation, either particular or corporate, and which
are currently considered private schools for the purposes of determining qualification for
public funding. This definition would exclude all public and separate or dissentient schools
(where appropriate, both of these types will be referred to as public, in the sense of publicly
funded) and those private schools which have no religious affiliation.
3. T. E. Giles & A. J. Proudfoot, EducationalAdministration in Canada,3rd ed. (Calgary:
Detselig Enterprises, 1984) at 12-13.

472 The Dalhousie Law Journal

tional schools, with or without public assistance. This has produced a
uniquely Canadian problem. On the one hand we have provided for
publicly supported denominational education, provided, of course, that
the denomination is either generic Protestant or Roman Catholic. We
have thereby conceded, at least federally, that a right to publicly supported denominational education exists in Canada. On the other hand,
while religious instruction, or at least instruction about religion, is a local
option in some of our pluralistic public schools, "it is a custom more
honour'd in the breach than the observance."4 Except in Newfoundland,
true publicly supported denominational education is guaranteed, albeit
not universally, to two denominations and is practised, where possible, by
only one. Constitutional provision is not made for the public support of
alternate denominational education. The historical justification for this
state of affairs is not universally accepted. As Shapiro stated in his
discussion of the Ontario context:
On moral grounds, limiting public support to Roman Catholic schools
seems indefensible, for the constitutional provisions usually advanced to
justify the special status of such schools serve only to describe its history.
They do nothing to inform us about what we ought to do .... The special
status of Roman Catholic schools is discriminatory. 5
private denominational schools are acutely
Parents of students attending
6
"fact".
this
of
aware
The arguments related to this issue have been discussed in such detail,
in government reports7 and in the academic literature, s that one might
wonder whether there is anything left to debate. However, as long as this
"discrimination" exists there will be groups who will feel aggrieved and
who will appeal to the courts for relief. Adler v. Ontariorepresents the
latest inevitable instalment in the saga surrounding private school funding in Canada and, more particularly, in Ontario.

4. Hamlet, I. iii. 15-16.
5. B. J. Shapiro, "The Public Funding of Private Schools in Ontario: The Setting, Some

Arguments, and Some Matters ofBelief' (1986), 11 Canadian Journal ofEducation 264 at 269.
6. C. D. Gerrard, Argument for the Appellants, before the Tax Assessment Review Boardfor

the Provinceof Saskatchewan. (Available from Dr. C. D. Gerrard, 2457 Eastview, Saskatoon,
Saskatchewan, 1986) at 7. See also C. D. Gerrard, Statement before the BoardofRevision, City
of Saskatoon, 18 February, 1986. (Available from Dr. C. D. Gerrard, 2457 Eastview,

Saskatoon, Saskatchewan).
7. See for example: The Report of the Commission on PrivateSchools in Ontario (Ontario:
Queen's Printer, 1985) (Shapiro Report); A Review of Private Schooling in Saskatchewan

(Regina: West-Con Management Services, 1987) (Dirks Report).
8. See forexample: R. M. Miller, "ShouldThere BeReligious Alternative Schools Within The
Public School System?" (1986), 11 Canadian Journal of Education 278; R. F. Magsino,
"Human Rights, Fair Treatment, and Funding of Private Schools in Canada" (1986), I1
Canadian Journal of Education 245; Shapiro, supra,note 5.
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The Case
Adler involved two sets of applicants, both seeking similar forms of
relief. The first group, referred to as the "Adler applicants," was composed of five parents of students attending Jewish day schools in Ontario. 9
The second group, referred to as the "Elgersma applicants," was composed of the Ontario Alliance of Christian School Societies (OACSS) and
four parents of students attending private Christian schools which were
members of OACSS.10 To further complicate matters, a child of one of the
Adler applicants and two of the children of the Elgersma applicants had
physical or mental disabilities such that these children would have been
identified as "exceptional" students, and would have been provided with
special education services by the local school board and health support
services at the school site by the Ministry of Health, if they had been
attending either of the public school systems.
Intervener status was granted to the Ontario Federation of Independent
Schools (OFIS)' 'supporting the applicants, and the Metropolitan Toronto
School Board (MTSB), the Ontario Public School Boards Association
(OPSBA) and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) supporting the respondents.

9. There are now 25 Jewish schools in Ontario, of which 19 are in Metropolitan Toronto, two
in Hamilton, two in Ottawa (one of which is a French language school), one in London, and
one in Kitchener. Approximately 10,000 students attend these schools.Adlerv. Ontario,supra,
note 1 at 681.
10. There are currently 74 member Christian school societies which operate 75 school s- 73
in Ontario and two in the Maritimes. Eleven of the 75 schools are secondary schools, all of
which are located in Ontario. In the 1991-92 school year, 11,614 students were enrolled in
OACSS schools in Ontario, almost 2,000 of whom are enrolled in secondary schools.

Membership in OACSS is open to any incorporated, non-profit society whose purpose is to
provide to children a Christian education in the Calvinistic or Reformed Christian tradition.
Most Society members are members of the Christian Reformed Church.Adlerv. Ontarioibid.,

at 683.
11. OFIS represents approximately 114 independent schools in Ontario, having a total
enrolment of approximately 7,000 students. It represents an association of religious schools of
several denominations. While a substantial number of the schools which OFIS represents have
been established for specific religious purposes and aim their program to instil religious values
and beliefs, other member schools have as their explicit purpose a fostering and instilling of
values and beliefs not specifically linked to any form of religion, but emphasizing certain
pedagogical values and goals. Adler v. Ontario,ibid., at 686.
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Both applicant groups sought similar but not identical relief.1 2 The
core of their argument was that they were required by law to ensure that
their children attend school but that they could not, for reasons of
conscience and religion, send their children to either of the publicly
funded school systems in Ontario. They claimed, therefore, that they
were denied equal benefit of the law as required by s. 15 of the Canadian

12. The Adler applicants requested the following:
(1) a declaration that the non-funding of Jewish day school education in Ontario is
unconstitutional;
(2) a declaration that the Applicants and the parents or families of children in Jewish
day schools in Ontario are entitled to the benefit of funding by the Province of Ontario
on a basis equivalent to the funding provided to Roman Catholic separate schools and
to public schools;
(3) an order that the Province of Ontario provide funds to the Applicants and to all
parents orfamilies of children inJewish day schools in Ontario, by means of apercapita
grant system or other system of funding based on the student population of those
schools;
(4) in the alternative to (3) Supra, an order that the Province of Ontario provide funds
to the Applicants and to all parents or families of children in Jewish day schools in
Ontario, by means of a capita grant or other system of funding to cover the secular
portion of the education provided in those schools;
(5) an order that the Province of Ontario extend school health support services to the
children in the Jewish day schools.
Adler v. Ontario,supra, note 1 at 682.
The Elgersma applicants requested relief in the following terms:
(1) a declaration that the non-funding by the Minister of Education of independent
Christian schools which are members of the Ontario Alliance of Christian School
Societies infringes rights of the applicants guaranteed under sections 2(a) and 15(1) of
the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms;
(2) a declaration that the Applicants, and parents or families of children in independent Christian schools which are members of the Ontario Alliance of Christian School
Societies, are equally entitled to the benefit of educational funding by the Province of
Ontario as are parents or families of children in public schools and Roman Catholic
separate schools;
(3) an order that the Province of Ontario provide funds to the Applicants and to all
parents or families of children in independent Christian schools which are members of
the Ontario Alliance of Christian School Societies by means of a per capital grant
system or other system of funding based on the student population of those schools;
(4) a declaration that s.1 of the Ontario Regulation 638/84 (s.44a of Reg. 452, R.R.O.
1980, as amended) made under the Health InsuranceAct infringes rights guaranteed
under ss. 2(a) and 15(1) of the CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms by reason of
its failure to provide school health support services to students in OACSS member
schools who require such services and an order that the Province of Ontario extend
school health support services to any student enrolled in an OACSS member school who
requires such services.
Adler v. Ontario,ibid, at 685.
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Charterof Rights and Freedoms13 and that there was interference with
their freedoms of religion and conscience which are guaranteed in s. 2(a)
of the Charter.
Section 15 Claims
Both Adler and Elgersma applicants submitted that the existence of
public funding for Roman Catholic separate schools in Ontario was
germane to their argument in that they were denied equal benefit of the
law. However, Anderson J. ruled that the existence of separate school
funding in Ontario was "... . a constitutional anomaly, with its roots in a
historic political compromise made as an incident of the Confederation
of 1867."' 4 He supported his argument with reference to the Bill 30
Reference case15 in which the Supreme Court of Canada found that public
funding of Catholic education in Ontario was constitutionally guaranteed
and therefore could not infringe Charter rights. Anderson*J. found,
therefore, that such funding was not relevant to whether the applicants'
s. 15 rights had been violated.
No doubt anticipating this finding, the intervener OFIS did not base its
argument of a s. 15 violation on the existence of public funding for
Ontario Roman Catholic schools. Rather, the OFIS argued that a substantial benefit is bestowed upon persons whose religious beliefs are consistent with the publicly funded education provided in the Ontario public
school system. This benefit is denied to individuals who, for reasons of
conscience and religion, cannot send their children to the public schools.
Anderson J. applied the framework for s. 15 claim analysis set out in
R. v. Swain 16 and found that the Ontario EducationAct 7 has created a
distinction between those whose children receive the benefit of a free
education in the public systems and those who, for religious reasons,
cannot send their children to public schools. Since the requirement of
paying tuition clearly places a burden and/or disadvantage on these
parents, this distinction is discrimination within the meaning of s. 15.
Religion is one of the grounds enumerated in s. 15; therefore, failure to

13. Being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.1 1.
14. Adler v. Ontario,supra, note 1 at 693.
15. Reference re Act to Amend the EducationAct, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.
16. R. v. Swain, [ 1991] 63 C.C.C. (2d) 481 (S.C.C.) at 520-521. Within the Swain framework,

the court must first determine whether one of the four basic equality rights defined in s. 15 has
been denied; second, the court must determine whether such denial can be said to result in
discrimination; finally the court must determine whether the personal characteristic upon
which the discrimination is based falls within the grounds enumerated in s.15 or within
analogous grounds.
17. EducationAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 129 [now Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.E.2].
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fund private parochial schools while funding public schools does result
in a violation of the applicants' s. 15 rights.
Section 2 Claims
The applicants also argued that compulsory attendance laws, when
coupled with the failure to provide funding for parochial schools, constituted a violation of their rights under s. 2(a) of the Charter.s In finding
that there had been a violation of s. 2(a) Anderson J., following R. v. Big
M Drug Mart Ltd.,19 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Limited," and
Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board,21 determined that while it might appear
that it was the applicants' religious belief which imposed a burden or
constraint on them, and not the law, to his mind it was government action
(i.e., Ontario's EducationAct 22) which created this burden or constraint.
Following this logic, Anderson J. found that the applicants' s. 2(a) rights
had been infringed by the government's failure to fund their schools.
Application of s. 1 of the Charter
The applicants' claim foundered, however, on the shoals of s. 1 of the
Charter.23 Anderson J. employed the test enunciated by Dickson C.J.C.
in R. v. Oakes24, reaching the following conclusions.
First, the nonfunding of private parochial schools in Ontario was a
direct result of a sufficiently important government objective, that is, the
development and maintenance of a healthy system of public schools.
Second, the means used (i.e., nonfunding of private schools) was found
to be rationally connected to this objective. Third, since the means chosen

18. Section 2(a) of the Charterstates:
2.
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(a)
19.
20.
21.
22.

freedom of conscience and religion;

R. vi Big MDrug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
R. v. Edwards Books andArt Limited, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (Ont. C.A.).
EducationAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 129 [now Education Act, R.S.O., 1990, c.E.2].

23. Section 1of the Charterstates:
1.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms

set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
24. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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by the government did not coerce parents into subjecting their children to
an education inconsistent with their religious beliefs and did not deny
them the right to educate their children as they saw fit, it was found to
impair as little as possible the rights of the applicants. Finally, it was
determined that the adverse effects on the applicants were not out of
proportion to the government's objective of providing a universally
accessible secular public education.
Therefore, while Charterrights had been violated, these violations
were found to be reasonable limits on the applicants' rights, limits which
were demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Adler v. Ontarioand The "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine
Most significant however, from my point of view, is Justice Anderson's
addendum to his discussion of the application of s. 1 of the Charterto the
s. 2 and s. 15 questions in this case. Anderson J. stated:
... it is only proper to acknowledge that throughout my deliberations I
have been influenced by the thought that I have been considering, particularly in the case of s. 1, matters better suited to consideration by the
legislature2
In making this point, Anderson J. explicitly joined a growing number of
Canadian jurists26 who are tactfully expressing their concern with the
legislatures' apparent abdication of political responsibility which has,
with increasing frequency, confronted the courts with choices which
properly belong in the hands of politicians. In other words, he suggested
that the legislatures should not be downloading the responsibility for
politically difficult decisions to the courts.
Anderson J. points out, albeit obliquely, that in an area like education,
where even the experts cannot agree on the correct policy, judges are
certainly not qualified to be making sensitive policy decisions. To make
this point he cites the U.S. Supreme Court decision in San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, where the court argued:
The ultimate wisdom as to these and related problems of education is not
likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly
debate the issues. In such circumstances, the Judiciary is well advised to
refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that
could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and
to keeping abreast of ever changing conditions. 27
25. Adler v. Ontario,supra, note 1 at 707.
26. See forexample: Reference rePublicEmployeeRelationsAct(Alta.),[1987] 1S.C.R. 313,
at 392 per Le Dain J.; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 993 per Dickson, C.J.
27. San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), at 43.
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Anderson J. also suggests that most of the difficult policy decisions in
education are choices between competing values; and that such policy
decisions are inherently political and belong in the hands of politicians,
not judges. In support, he cites La Forest J. in McKinney v. University of
Guelph:
Decisions on such matters must inevitably be the product of a mix of
conjecture, fragmentary knowledge, general experience and knowledge of
the needs, aspirations and resources of society, and other components.
They are decisions of a kind where those engaged in the political and
legislative activities ofCanadian democracy have evident advantages over
members of the judicial branch ....
In the end, Anderson J.appears to express regret that he cannot help the
applicants; that his role is to interpret the law as it is defined by legislators
and that this does not necessarily allow him to undo injustice:
I am much in sympathy with the position of the applicants. There are few
things which touch a concerned parent more closely than the appropriate
education of children. To feel oneself at a disadvantage in giving effect to
that concern produces a very real sense of grievance.29
Anderson J.suggests that in a case such as that presented by the
applicants, the court is being asked to direct the Government of Ontario
to radically revise its system of educational finance through a means yet
to be defined and with results both undetermined and indeterminable.
Judges, he concludes, are not the right people to be making such
decisions:
Notwithstanding my sympathy with the position of the applicants and with
their sense of grievance, I am in doubt that the court is the appropriate
forum for relief."
Anderson J.'s solution to such judicial angst is to suggest:
Perhaps the time has come for the courts to enunciate something analogous
to the "political question" doctrine or the "public purpose" doctrine which
have evolved in the U.S.A. I do not purport to do more than raise the
answer must be provided at some other level of the judicial
question. The
31
hierarchy.
What Anderson J.meant by his reference to the "public purpose" doctrine
is unclear; the term does not appear to be in common usage in the context
of American constitutional law, and Anderson . does not elaborate. On

28. McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at 304-305.
29. Adler v. Ontario,supra, note 1 at 709.

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., at 707.
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the otherhand, the "political question" doctrine, which is anythingbutthe
simple concept this statement would seem to imply, deserves some
serious consideration in the Canadian context.
Though politicians would no doubt deny it vehemently, Canadians
have nevertheless observed in recent years a distinct lack of political
courage on the part of many officials who will one day face re-election.
This lack of "backbone" has resulted in what appears to be a relentless
"downloading" or perhaps "sideloading" of responsibility, wherever
possible, for decisions which might be considered politically unpopular.
In the area of education, provincial governments have found the
Charterto be an exceptionally useful instrument for "passing the buck"
to the courts. Rather than, for example, forcing arecalcitrant school board
to provide French language high school programs and facilities equal in
quality to those offered in the English language schools, Ontario was
content to let local parents use the Charterto carry the battle through the
provincial court system.32 I t can be argued thatAlberta,3s Saskatchewan,'
and Nova Scotia, 3 also side-stepped making decisions relating to French
language education in much the same way.
The public funding of parochial schools would appear to be another
sensitive issue politicians would rather avoid. It is interesting to note in
this regard that Dirks, in his report on the public funding of private schools
in Saskatchewan, advised that, "until such time as the courts rule on the
constitutionalityofpresentfunding arrangements,in the opinion of this
review it would not be prudent to proceed with a major public funding
initiative for private schools". 3 6In other words, the government should do
nothing until the courts require it to act; when this happens the government can tearfully announce that it has been forced to take this unpopular
step.
What Anderson J. suggests is that, in order to counter this sideloading
of responsibility, his colleagues in Canada's higher courts should consider the possible adoption of what in the United States is referred to as
the "political question" doctrine. According to Tribe, there are at least
three interpretations of what this doctrine might mean:

32. Marchandv. Simcoe County Boardof Education (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 638 (Ont. H.C.J.).
33. Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342.
34. Commission des Ecoles FransaskoisesInc. etal. v. Saskatchewan (1988), 64 Sask. R. 123
(Q.B.).
35. Lavoie v. Nova Scotia (1988), 84 N.S.R. (2d) 387 (S.C.).

36. Dirks Report, supra, note 7 at 66. [Emphasis added.]
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1. The Classical view: ". . . the court finds, purely as a matter of
constitutional interpretation, that the Constitution itself has committed the
determination of the issue to the autonomous decision of another agency
of government.""7
2. The Prudentialview:"... the Court's role would treat the 'political
question' doctrine as a means to avoid passing on the merits of a question
when reaching the merits would force the Court to compromise an
important principle or would undermine the Court's authority."38
3. The Functional view: "... the Court would have to consider such
factors as the difficulties in gainingjudicial access to relevant information,
the need for uniformity of decision, and the wider responsibilities of the
when determining whether or not to decide
other branches of government,
39
a certain issue or case.
All three interpretations appear to agree on the following:
There are certain constitutional questions which are inherently nonjusticiable. These "political questions," it is said, concern matters as to
which departments of government other than the courts, or perhaps the
electorate as a whole, must have a final say. With respect to these matters,
the judiciary does not define constitutional limits.'
In straightforward terms, a "political question" doctrine would give the
court a basis from which to decide that an issue brought before it was not
really appropriate to a legal forum because it involved political decisions
made by arms of government constitutionally empowered and functionally suited to make such choices. This does not argue that there are certain
parts of the Constitution to which the courts should be blind. Rather,
courts would retain the power to determine whether government action
had remained within the constitutional grant of authority. While the
notion of "non-justiciability" may be relatively new to many Canadians,
the principle of non-justiciability is clearly present in certain sections of
the Charter, notably s. 29 which protects existing denominational,
separate and dissentient school rights, and s. 33, the notwithstanding
clause.
Anderson J.'s suggestion is understandable; he would hope that
adoption by Canadian courts of something analogous to the "political
question" doctrine might provide a number of benefits. Among these
might be the following:

37. L. H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw (Mineola, NY: The Foundation Press, 1978)
at71.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., at 72.
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1. By invoking such a doctrine the court would be refusing to "do
the government's dirty work." The court would, in effect, be telling
parliament or the legislature in question that it was responsible for the
creation of the political issues erroneously brought before the court and
that any solution to the problems raised would have to be provided by the
appropriate forum - the legislature. In theory at least, this .should force
governments to accept the political consequences of their political
decisions.
2. Because it would be much easier to identify spheres of responsibility, groups wishing to challenge existing legislation would know
which avenue to pursue. As it currently stands, aggrieved groups frequently seek relief through both political and legal avenues, sometimes
simultaneously. Most groups do not have the resources to maintain a
battle on two fronts. Groups such as those involvedin theAdlercase could
avoid wasting valuable resources pursuing their grievance through a
court system which simply cannot provide the relief they desire, regardless of the apparent justice of their claim.
3.
Judges would be relieved of the responsibility of making political decisions which are inevitably based on value choices. Certainly,
judges can and do make value-judgements; however, judges cannot be
held accountable if their values are inconsistent with the values society
wishes to have promoted. Politicians are made accountable to the electorate on a regular basis.
4. Judges would be relieved of the responsibility of making decisions in areas in which they have very limited, if any, expertise. Education is a paradigm example.
Adoption of a doctrine similar to the "political question" doctrine
would appear to offer at least a partial solution to these problems because
it would provide an avenue through which the courts could avoid making
decisions which should be the responsibility of elected officials.
Unfortunately, such a solution may be too quick and easy. As the
different interpretations of the concept indicate, the "political question"
doctrine has never worked particularly smoothly in the United States. Not
only has the doctrine been interpreted in different ways at different times,
the U.S. Supreme Court has found it quite easy (fortunately, from a civil
rights perspective) to simply ignore the doctrine when it saw fit. For
example, in Brown v. BoardofEducation4 the Supreme Court ruled that
schools were to be desegregated even though elected, and therefore
accountable, politicians had made the political decisions which had
permitted segregation.
41. Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Anderson J. suggests thathe does not"... purport to do more than raise
the question [of whether Canada needs a "political question" doctrine].
... The answer must be provided at some other level of the judicial
hierarchy. 42 Perhaps that answer has been provided, at least partially, by
Wilson J.'s discussion of the doctrine in Operation Dismantle v. The
Queen.43 In her decision Wilson J. pointed out that Canadian courts are
frequently asked to "decide questions of principle and policy"'44 and
concluded that she could not ".... accept the proposition that difficulties
of evidence or proof absolve the court from making a certain kind of
decision if it can be established on other grounds that it has a duty to do
so."' What must be kept in mind, however, is that:
... judicial review is not the same thing as substitution of the court's
opinion on the merits for the opinion of the person or body to whom a
discretionary decision-making power has been committed. The first step
is to determine as a constitutional matter who has the decision-making
power; second is to determine
the scope (if any) of judicial review of the
46
exercise of that power.
If, in the first instance, the court is being asked to pass judgement on the
wisdom of a government decision which was made as part of that
government's exercise of constitutionally assigned powers, the court
should decline to intervene. If, however, the court is asked to determine
whether a government policy violates the Charterrights of citizens, then
she argues that it is not "open to [a court] to relinquish its jurisdiction
either on the basis that the issue is inherently non-justiciable or that it
raises a so-called 'political question'."'47 After all, she points out, s. 24(1)
of the Charterstates unequivocally that such decisions are the responsibility of "a court of competent jurisdiction."
However, this does not leave minorities without an avenue of relief
when they find themselves subject to the tyranny of the majority, nor does
it make the state hostage to the peculiar values of a small group of
individuals. As Wilson J. points out, Charterrights are not unfettered;
Charterguarantees are subject to s. 1:
[This] is the uniquely Canadian mechanism through which the courts are
to determine the justiciability of particular issues that come before it [sic].
It embodies through its reference to a free and democratic society the
essential features of our constitution including the separation of powers,

42. Adler v. Ontario, supra,note 1 at 707.

43. Operation Dismantle v. The Queen (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.).
44. Ibid., at 499.
45. Ibid., at 500.
46. Ibid., at 503.

47. Ibid., at 504.
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responsible government and the rule of law. It obviates the need for a
"political questions" doctrine and permits the court to deal with what
might be termed "prudential" considerations in a principled way without
renouncing
its constitutional and mandated responsibility for judicial
4
review. S

The Adler case exemplifies a situation in which citizens' rights are
being violated by government action; therefore, according to Wilson J.'s
argument, the court is obligated to review the government's policy. This
review is not an arbitrary procedure; the court has a test (the Oakes test)
which it uses to determine whether the state's purpose, the effects of
which violate the rights of citizens, justifies the violation. The court is
required to defer neither to the individual nor to the state but must weigh
the relative costs and benefits to each and reach a determination concerning whether the violation is a "reasonable limit". Obviously, in Adler,
Anderson J. concluded that the non-funding of parochial schools was
reasonable in light of the government's purpose.
Given Anderson J.'s heartfelt sympathy for the Adler and Elgersma
applicants and his obvious concern forjustice and fair play (both laudable
in their own right), it is not difficult to understand his frustration. He
would rather not have to tell the applicants that the court could not provide
the relief they desired; however, he was obligated to reach a decision (the
first step in the review process, as Wilson J. has pointed out) and he did
so. The second part of process was to determine the scope of judicial
review; s. 1 defined the scope of the review and the Oakes test provided
the means. Anderson J. employed each appropriately in reaching his
decision in the Adler case.
If Anderson, J. believed that the violations of the applicants' freedoms
of conscience and religion were notjustified by the government purposes
presented in evidence, he could have ruled that the impugned legislation
failed the proportionality section of the Oakes test and found in favour of
the applicants. He did not reach this conclusion. AndersonJ. was at liberty
to employ the Oakes test either liberally or conservatively; he chose to
employ it conservatively.
The fact that Anderson J. was not comfortable with the decision he
reached in Adler does not suggest that a mechanism such as the "political
question" doctrine is the solution to this age-old problem.

48. Supra, note 43 at 518.

